The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy
Year of publication: |
November 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Harrington, Joseph Emmett |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 160.2017, p. 78-81
|
Subject: | Collusion | Antitrust | Competition law | Structural remedy | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Wettbewerbsrecht | Theorie | Theory | Kartell | Cartel | Fusionskontrolle | Merger control |
-
Kaplow, Louis, (2007)
-
U.S. antitrust law and policy in historical perspective
Sawyer, Laura Phillips, (2019)
-
Reply to Connor and Lande on cartel overcharges
Langenfeld, James A., (2017)
- More ...
-
Private monitoring and communication in cartels: Explaining recent collusive practices
Harrington, Joseph Emmett, (2009)
-
When does a self-serving antitrust authority act in society's best interests?
Harrington, Joseph Emmett, (2009)
-
Harrington, Joseph Emmett, (2016)
- More ...