The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm
This article demonstrates that the partitioning of economic activity into for-profit and nonprofit organizations can be at least partially described as the solution to an optimal contracting problem. We show that nonprofit firms may be superior to for-profit firms if the output cannot be costlessly observed.
Year of publication: |
1983
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Authors: | Easley, David ; O'Hara, Maureen |
Published in: |
Bell Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0361-915X. - Vol. 14.1983, 2, p. 531-538
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
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