The Economics and Antitrust of Bundling

This article explains the economics and antitrust of bundling. I first show that popular arguments such as demand complementarities, economies of scope, and price discrimination are not sufficient. I then detail potentially anticompetitive factors such as leverage and opacity. I then use simple examples to show how variation in consumer valuations explains bundling and is not anticompetitive. Finally, I explore other business judgment rule explanations for bundling

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Bhattacharya, Rajeev R.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and the Law Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 15, 2020 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3384230 [DOI]
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D42 - Monopoly ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; L50 - Regulation and Industrial Policy. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014106369