The Economics of Delegated Regulation: The EEC and the Case of Insurance
It is the stated objective of the European Commission to open hitherto protected industries to international competition by the end of 1992. To this end, national governments have ceded regulatory authority over insurance to the Commission. Rather surprisingly however, the Commission in its turn appears to delegate this authority to insurance associations in EEC member countries. In this contribution, an attempt is made to explain why a supranational government might take the dual decision not to wield newly-won powers and to choose industry associations rather than governments as its partners in the regulatory process. The paper also sheds some light on the implications of such delegated regulation both for the Commission and insurers. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1993) 18, 77–91. doi:10.1007/BF01125819
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Zweifel, Peter ; Eisen, Roland ; Müller, Wolfgang |
Published in: |
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review. - Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 1554-964X. - Vol. 18.1993, 1, p. 77-91
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Publisher: |
Palgrave Macmillan |
Saved in:
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