The Effect of Short–Selling on the Aggregation of Information in an Experimental Asset Market
We show by means of a laboratory experiment that the relaxation of short–selling constraints causes the price of both an overvalued and an undervalued asset to decrease. Hence, the aggregation of information by the market price becomes better in case the asset is overvalued but worse if the asset is undervalued. With respect to payoffs, we find that not only uninformed but also some of the imperfectly informed traders suffer from the weakening of short–selling constraints.
Year of publication: |
2008-07
|
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Authors: | Vorsatz, Marc ; Veiga, Helena |
Institutions: | FEDEA |
Saved in:
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