The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships
Why do some dictatorships establish institutions that are typically associated with democracy, such as legislatures or political parties? We propose a new theoretical model of institutions and power-sharing in dictatorships. We argue that by facilitating power-sharing, political institutions promote the survival of dictatorships. However, authoritarian power-sharing through institutions is feasible only when it is backed by the crude but credible threat of a rebellion by the dictator's allies. Whereas the allies' political opportunities determine the credibility of the threat of a rebellion, institutions alleviate the commitment and monitoring problems that stem from the secrecy in authoritarian governance. We use both historical and large-N data to assess these new predictions about the relationship between political institutions, dictator tenure, and the concentration of power in dictatorships.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Boix, Carles ; Svolik, Milan |
Institutions: | Research Programme in Political Economy (RPPE), Princeton University |
Saved in:
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