The Gains from Corporate Selloffs: The Case of Real Estate Assets
Recent financial economics literature has hypothesized that variations in market structure influence the distribution of gains from corporate restructuring between buyers and sellers. We test this hypothesis using data on restructuring involving real estate assets by isolating the effects depending on multiple versus single bidders, acquisition frequency and transaction type. While we find gains for both buyers and sellers, the buyers gain only when they make few purchases. Those firms pursuing an acquisition strategy show no gains around the specific acquisition announcements. Additionally, both buyers and sellers are more likely to have a positive reaction to the announcement when the transaction is property rather than a division or subsidiary. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.
Year of publication: |
1991
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Authors: | Glascock, John L. ; Davidson, Wallace N. ; Sirmans, C. F. |
Published in: |
Real Estate Economics. - American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association - AREUEA. - Vol. 19.1991, 4, p. 567-582
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Publisher: |
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association - AREUEA |
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