The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem

The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Ben-Yashar, Ruth
Published in:	Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 77.2014, 2, p. 237-241
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Condorcet jury theorem \| Homogeneity assumption \| Average individual probability

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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