The impact of liability for malpractice on the optimal reimbursement schemes for health services
Year of publication: |
2004-08-11
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Authors: | Ossig, Sonja ; Feess, Eberhard |
Institutions: | Econometric Society |
Subject: | principal-agent-theory | multi-task | health care | hospital compensation schemes | liability law |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Econometric Society Far Eastern Meetings 2004 Number 396 |
Classification: | I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets ; I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability |
Source: |
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