The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance
This paper offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of the exclusive agency and exclusive-right-to-sell contracts used in real estate brokerage. The theoretical model predicts that while both contract types will yield the same price, the exclusive agency contract will result in faster sales than the exclusive-right-to-sell contract. In the empirical model, we find that houses sold faster under the exclusive agency contract than the exclusive-right-to-sell contract. However, houses sold with exclusive agency contracts also sold at a marginally lower price. We also find a slightly greater concession from the listing price at the negotiation stage of exclusive agency listings. Copyright 2001 by the American Real Estate and Urban Ecopnomics Assocaition.
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Rutherford, Ronald C. ; Springer, Thomas M. ; Yavas, Abdullah |
Published in: |
Real Estate Economics. - American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association - AREUEA. - Vol. 29.2001, 3, p. 389-409
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Publisher: |
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association - AREUEA |
Saved in:
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