The Influence of Information Externalities on the Value of Reputation Building - An Experiment
We observe that information externalities arise in sequential equilibrium of the chain store game such that the amount of reputation building among partners differs from that among strangers. No matching effects are predicted for the trust game. Our experiment confirms the qualitative chain store prediction, but information externalities also show up in the trust game.
Year of publication: |
2005-06-15
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Authors: | Bolton, Gary E. ; Ockenfels, Axel |
Institutions: | Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät |
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