The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on the domain of strict preference profiles, although it fails to be Maskin-monotonic and is hence not implementable in Nash equilibrium. The Majoritarian Compromise is Pareto-optimal and obeys SNIP (strong no imposition power), i.e. never chooses a strict majority's worst candidate. In fact, it is "majoritarian approving" i.e. it always picks "what's good for a majority" (alternatives which some majority regards as among the better "effective" half of the available alternatives). Thus, being Pareto-optimal and majoritarian approving, it is majoritarian-optimal. Finally, the Majoritarian Compromise is measured against various criteria, such as consistency and Condorcet-consistency.
Year of publication: |
1999-08-31
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Authors: | Yilmaz, Bilge ; Sertel, Murat R. |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 16.1999, 4, p. 615-627
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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