The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Levine, David K. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 132.2007, 1, p. 461-473
|
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem |
-
Defensive plays in repeated games
Aramendia, Miguel, (2019)
-
Partial collusion with asymmetric cross-price effects
Savorelli, Luca, (2010)
-
A "super" folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
Anderlini, Luca, (2008)
- More ...
-
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory
Block, Juan I., (2018)
-
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
Dekel, Eddie, (2001)
-
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory
Block, Juan I., (2019)
- More ...