The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooerative Majority Games

This paper studies noncooperative bargaining with random proposers in proper single games. A power index is called consistent if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game with random proposers using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses the balancedness result in Kohlberg (1971) reinterpreting the balancing wieghts as mixed strategies.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Montero, M.P.
Institutions:	Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Subject:	noncooperative bargaining \| random proposers \| nucleolus \| consistency \| balancedness

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series CentER Discussion Paper Number 2001-39
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091801