The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Che, Yeon-Koo ; Gale, Ian |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 4105394. - Vol. 92.2000, 2, p. 198-233
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