The optimal regulation of a risky monopoly
Year of publication: |
March 2017
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Authors: | Hiriart, Yolande ; Thomas, Lionel |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 51.2016, p. 111-136
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Subject: | Risk regulation | Incentives | Moral hazard | Adverse selection | Insolvency | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Adverse Selektion | Regulierung | Regulation | Monopol | Monopoly | Risiko | Risk | Insolvenz | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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