The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity
Year of publication: |
May 2017
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Authors: | Newton, Jonathan |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 46.2017, 2, p. 583-589
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Subject: | Evolution | Moral values | Assortative matching | Theorie | Theory | Ethik | Ethics | Matching |
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