The q-Condorcet efficiency of positional rules
According to a given quota q, a candidate a is beaten by another candidate b if at least a proportion of q individuals prefer b to a. The q-Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the probability that the rule selects a q-Condorcet winner (q-CW), that is any candidate who is never beaten under the q-majority. Closed form representations are obtained for the q-Condorcet efficiency of positional rules (simple and sequential) in three-candidate elections. This efficiency is significantly greater for sequential rules than for simple positional rules.
Year of publication: |
2013-12-06
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Authors: | Courtin, Sebastien ; Martin, Mathieu ; Moyouwou, Issofa |
Institutions: | HAL |
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