The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Balkenborg, Dieter ; Hofbauer, Josef ; Kuzmics, Christoph |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 44.2015, 1, p. 165-193
|
Subject: | Best-response correspondence | Persistent equilibria | Nash equilibrium refinements | Strict and weak dominance | Strategic stability | Fictitious play | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory |
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