The Repression of Dissent
This article describes a substitution model of states' responses to dissident behavior and a statistical test of some sequential hypotheses that are derived from the model. It is motivated by an interest in understanding the sequential response of states to dissident activity. That is, if dissidents protest, what will the state do next? Similarly, if dissidents are cooperative, what will the state do next? The author argues that the answer to both of these questions depends on the interaction of the state's most recent behavior (i.e., repression or accommodation) and the dissident's response. The model produces the hypothesis that states substitute repression for accommodation, and vice versa, in response to dissident protest. Statistical analysis of evidence from Peru and Sri Lanka, 1955 to 1991, suggests that the model captures well the sequential responses of the Peruvian and Sri Lankan governments to dissident behavior during that period.
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Moore, Will H. |
Published in: |
Journal of Conflict Resolution. - Peace Science Society (International). - Vol. 44.2000, 1, p. 107-127
|
Publisher: |
Peace Science Society (International) |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Coalition government formation and foreign exchange markets : theory and evidence from Europe
Moore, Will H., (2006)
-
Judical power in domestic and international politics
Staton, Jeffrey K., (2011)
-
Time horizons matter : the hazard rate of coalition governments and the size of government
Bejar, Sergio, (2011)
- More ...