The robustness of "enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend" alliances
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Rietzke, David ; Roberson, Brian |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 40.2013, 4, p. 937-956
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Subject: | Koalition | Coalition | Allokation | Allocation | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Theorie | Theory |
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