The selectope for cooperative games

The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payoff vectors obtained by assigning the Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic point of view, as superset of the core and of the Weber set; and from a value-theoretic point of view, as containing weighted Shapley values, random order values, and sharing values.

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Year of publication:	2000-02-15
Authors:	Derks, Jean ; Haller, Hans ; Peters, Hans
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 29.2000, 1, p. 23-38
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Cooperative game \| selectope core \| Weber set \| sharing value

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received May 1997/Revised version September 1999
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598451