The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)
We show that in the marriage problem the student-optimal algorithm may in fact generate an equilibrium outcome that is college-optimal and student-pessimal in terms of the true preferences even though it is student-optimal and college-pessimal in terms of the submitted preferences. In the college admissions problem, the student-optimal algorithm generates either a matching that is not stable for the true preferences or a matching that is college-optimal and student-pessimal in terms of the true preferences. Thus, our results show that, in the absence of certain match variations, the newly designed student-optimal algorithm adopted by the NRMP since 1998 either may be bias in favor of hospitals in terms of the true preferences or fails to produce a true stable matching. We also discuss when the core is large and when the core is a singleton at a Nash equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Ma, Jinpeng |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 69.2010, 1, p. 150-164
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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