The speed of employer learning and job market signalling revisited
This article discusses the claim made by Altonji and Pierret (AP) (1997) and Lange (2007) that a high Speed of Employer Learning (SEL) indicates a low value of Job Market Signalling (JMS). It is first discussed intuitively in the light of Spence's original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed by AP (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if Employer Learning (EL) is incomplete, a high SEL is not necessarily indicative of a low value of JMS.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Habermalz, Steffen |
Published in: |
Applied Economics Letters. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 1350-4851. - Vol. 18.2011, 7, p. 607-610
|
Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Job Matching and the Returns to Educational Signals
Habermalz, Steffen, (2003)
-
An Examination of Sheepskin Effects Over Time
Habermalz, Steffen, (2003)
-
Bender, Keith A., (2005)
- More ...