The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results con rm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Nöldeke, Georg ; Peña, Jorge
Publisher:	Basel : University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
Subject:	Costly voting \| Participation games \| Mixed strategy equilibrium \| Polynomials in Bernstein form

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Series:	WWZ Working Paper ; 2015/08
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5451/unibas-ep61328 [DOI] 87431884X [GVK] hdl:10419/123476 [Handle] RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2015/08 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390717