The winner's curse under behavioral institutions
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Chlaß, Nadine |
Publisher: |
Jena : Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Unvollkommene Information | Allokationseffizienz | Theorie | imperfect information | common value auction | price-quality relation |
Series: | Jena Economic Research Papers ; 2011,011 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 657105074 [GVK] hdl:10419/56836 [Handle] |
Classification: | D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
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The Winner's Curse under Behavioral Institutions
Chalß, Nadine, (2011)
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The winner's curse under behavioral institutions
Chlaß, Nadine, (2011)
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Competition on common value markets with naèive traders: a theoretical and experimental analysis
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Giving in dictator games: Experimenter demand effect or preference over the rules of the game?
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Lying, spying, sabotaging: Procedures and consequences
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