To sell public or private goods
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Loertscher, Simon ; Marx, Leslie M. |
Published in: |
Review of economic design. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4750, ZDB-ID 1480089-5. - Vol. 26.2022, 3, p. 385-415
|
Subject: | Bilateral trade | Mechanism design | Non-fungible token (NFT) | Public goods | Revenue maximization | Öffentliche Güter | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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