Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Pei, Harry |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 16.2021, 2, p. 449-475
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Reputation | no commitment type | equilibrium payoff | equilibrium behavior |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE4182 [DOI] 1762978407 [GVK] hdl:10419/253525 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:4182 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: |
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Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
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