Truthful Reporting, Moral Hazard and Purely Soft Information
Year of publication: |
2012-08
|
---|---|
Authors: | De Chiara, Alessandro ; Livio, Luca |
Institutions: | European Centre for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management |
Subject: | corruption | moral hazard | soft information | supervision | truthful reporting |
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