Union bargaining power, relative wages, and efficiency in Canada
We use a computable general equilibrium model incorporating trade unions, efficient Nash contracts, existing distortions, and international trade to measure the deadweight loss in Canada arising from the ability of unions to raise wages above competitive levels. The model incorporates two features new to CGE analysis: parameterization of union bargaining power and variations in union preferences. Estimates indicate the deadweight loss to be no more than 0.04 per cent of GNP. However, the small aggregate effect masks considerable adjustments at the industry level, in imports and exports, and in the distribution of income. Adjustments are also larger with employment-oriented unions.
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Fisher, Timothy C.G. ; Waschik, Robert G. |
Published in: |
Canadian Journal of Economics. - Canadian Economics Association - CEA. - Vol. 33.2000, 3, p. 742-765
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Publisher: |
Canadian Economics Association - CEA |
Saved in:
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