Welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly

I investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces, while a private enterprise has no such obligation. I show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first-best outcome (Walrasian equilibrium).

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Matsumura, Toshihiro
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 1, p. 94-96
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Supply obligation \| Unique pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium \| Mixed markets

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; H4 - Publicly Provided Goods ; K2 - Regulation and Business Law ; L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572214