Welfare Effects of Banning Genetic Information in the Life Insurance Market: The Case of BRCA1/2 Genes
We investigate whether regulations that ban insurance companies from access to individuals' genetic tests are likely to lead to substantial adverse selection costs for the specific example of the so-called breast cancer (BRCA1/2) genes. Using a data set including economic, demographic, and relevant family background information to simulate the market for 10-year term life insurance, we find generally only modest adverse selection costs associated with such a regulatory ban. However, for family background groups that are at high risk for carrying one of these genes, the efficiency cost of adverse selection may be significant should the test become widely adopted. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2007.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Hoy, Michael ; Witt, Julia |
Published in: |
Journal of Risk & Insurance. - American Risk and Insurance Association - ARIA, ISSN 0022-4367. - Vol. 74.2007, 3, p. 523-546
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Publisher: |
American Risk and Insurance Association - ARIA |
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