Wheat or Strawberries? Intermediated Trade with Limited Contracting.

Why do developing countries fail to specialize in products that they (at least potentially) have a comparative advantage in? For example, farmers in land-poor developing countries overwhelmingly produce staples rather than exotic fruits that command high prices. We propose a simple model of trade and intermediation that shows how holdup resulting from poor contracting environments can produce such an outcome. We use the model to examine which polices can help ameliorate the problem, even when its cause cannot be eliminated. In the model, farmers can produce two types of goods. Wheat is suitable for subsistence but farmers are inefficient in producing it. Farmers are efficient in making strawberries, but cannot subsist on it, and have to sell them to an intermediary who makes profits by selling it at the world price. In a frictionless world farmers would specialize in strawberries. Central to the model is the inability of farmers and traders to contract ex-ante on a price. The absence of enforceable contracts sets the stage for the classic hold up problem and precludes negotiating the terms of trade prior to entry into production. We use a two period model with continuum of traders and farmers. In the first period, farmers decide whether to produce wheat or strawberries and intermediaries decide whether to enter the business of intermediation. In the second period, farmers and traders meet randomly and trade. Since meetings are random and traders do not know the number of local competitors but do know how thick the market is, they can infer the distribution of potential rivals and offer a price based on this information. In other words, traders compete for the output of farmers in the first price auction. As a result, some farmers fetch a high price for their strawberries; others fetch a low price, or even fail to meet an intermediary. Farmers make the production decision based on the expected price. We solve the model and characterize all the possible equilibria as a function of the primitive parameters. Of particular interest is the region in the parameter space that yields multiple equilibria. In the good equilibrium, specialization occurs according to comparative advantage and there is intermediation, while in the bad equilibrium, there is no intermediation and the staple is produced. Our work suggests that there may be some simple measures to ensure intermediation and specialization according to comparative advantage even if the government is not able to resolve the core issue, the underlying lack of enforceable contracts. A temporary production subsidy or a marketing board that ensures a sufficiently high minimum price to the farmer can help an economy remove the bad equilibrium without intermediation. This paper is closely related to the work of Antras and Costinot (2011). In their paper they focus on the implications of intermediation for globalization in a model that assumes that contracts between traders and producers are enforceable. We study the implications of contractual failure on production choices in a model of trade with intermediation.