When Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm Improves Welfare.

It is shown that even when vertical integration leads to an upstream monopoly, welfare can improve if the ex ante market share of the merging firm is large. This result is obtained in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium context with asymmetric marginal costs of production.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Linnemer, L.
Subject:	COSTS \| MONOPOLIES \| ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	30 pages
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L4 - Antitrust Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005641131