When do politicians appeal broadly? : the economic consequences of electoral rules in Brazil
Year of publication: |
August 2021
|
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Authors: | Chin, Moya |
Publisher: |
[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund |
Subject: | Electoral institutions | voting theory | political responsiveness | political favoritism | education resources | Brasilien | Brazil | Wahlsystem | Electoral system | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Politiker | Politicians | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | IMF working papers. - Washington, DC : IMF, ZDB-ID 2108494-4. - Vol. WP/21, 227 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
ISBN: | 978-1-5135-9579-5 |
Other identifiers: | 10.5089/9781513595795.001 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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