When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?
Year of publication: |
October 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz ; Dur, Umut Mert |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 72.2017, p. 16-24
|
Subject: | Harmless | Harmful | Matching | Mechanism | Non-bossiness | Characterization | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
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