When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement
Year of publication: |
2009-06
|
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Authors: | Decarolis, Francesco |
Institutions: | Banca d'Italia |
Subject: | auctions | public procurement | collusion | structural estimation |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 717 |
Classification: | L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L74 - Construction ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H57 - Procurement |
Source: |
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Clark, Robert, (2018)
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Collusion through market sharing agreements : evidence from Quebec's road paving market
Leverano, Adriano de, (2019)
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Awarding Price, Contract Performance and Bids Screening : Evidence from Procurement Auctions
Decarolis, Francesco, (2019)
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Decarolis, Francesco, (2010)
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Spagnolo, Giancarlo, (2016)
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Decarolis, Francesco, (2020)
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