Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Evrenk, Haldun |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 80.2011, 3, p. 498-510
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Political corruption | Reform | Political agency | Imperfect competition |
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