Why Arrow's theorem matters for political theory even if preference cycles never occur
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Ingham, Sean |
Published in: |
Public choice. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0048-5829, ZDB-ID 207597-0. - Vol. 179.2019, 1/2, p. 97-111
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Subject: | Arrow’s impossibility theorem | Populism | Democratic legitimacy | Popular will | Theorie | Theory | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Demokratie | Democracy |
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