Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Friedman, Daniel ; Wittman, Donald |
Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 1839950. - Vol. 57.1995, 1, p. 67-84
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