Will the information disclosure quality reduce the executives' excess perks? : evidence from China
Year of publication: |
April 2016
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Authors: | Li, Han |
Published in: |
International journal of financial research. - Toronto : Sciedu Press, ISSN 1923-4023, ZDB-ID 2611282-6. - Vol. 7.2016, 2, p. 73-83
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Subject: | information disclosure quality | executives' excess perks | top executives' compensation | state owned enterprises | Führungskräfte | Managers | China | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise |
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