Winner's Curse Corrections Magnify Adverse Selection
Year of publication: |
2009-06-15
|
---|---|
Authors: | Harstad, Ronald M. ; Bordley, Robert |
Institutions: | Economics Department, University of Missouri |
Subject: | winner's curse | adverse selection | common-value auctions | procurement | product quality |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 0907 13 pages longpgs. |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium |
Source: |
-
Auctions with endogenous price ceiling: Theoretical and experimental results
Veszteg, Robert F., (2009)
-
Existence of Equilibria in Procurement Auctions
Seres, Gyula, (2017)
-
Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement : A Simple Model of Handicapping
Cesi, Berardino, (2008)
- More ...
-
Behavioral Efficiency I: Definition, Methodology and Demonstration
Harstad, Ronald M., (2011)
-
Behavioral Efficiency II: A Simple Laboratory Demonstration
Harstad, Ronald M., (2011)
-
Applied Signaling: Graduate School Admissions and Frequency of STEM Majors
Harstad, Ronald M., (2013)
- More ...