Larissa Katharina Senninger analyses the phenomenon of wisdom of the crowd in experimental capital markets. Aiming to find out which market mechanism is able to aggregate different information in a meaningful way, a continuous double auction and a call auction mechanism are tested. In line with expectations, markets with continuous double auction mechanism are better able to aggregate information and additionally take a shorter time. The author shows that receiving more information enables subjects to make better estimations, whereas more information improves the quality of estimations significantly only if it is a lot more information. Contents • Wisdom of the Crowd • Market Experiments • Information Aggregation • Experimental Capital Markets • Trading Mechanisms • Estimation of Asset Value • Call Auction Mechanism • Continuous Double Auction Mechanism Target groups • Students and lecturers in the field of economy and banking & finance • Practitioners in the banking & finance sector The author Larissa Katharina Senninger holds a master’s degree from the Leopold-Franzens-University in Innsbruck. She started her professional career in the risk controlling department of a German finance service in Munich and is currently responsible for interest rate risk and liquidity risk
