Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation.
A strategic three party bargaining model is developed in which one distinguished party, the firm, has to reac h agreements with the other two, each of which is a group of workers. In the prebargaining stage, the two worker groups decide whether to organize jointly or separately. The main observation relates the equi librium pattern of unionization to the substitutability in production between the two groups: the outcome is joint or separate unions acco rding to whether the two groups are substitute or complementary facto rs of production. The analysis also considers possibilities for firm' s strategic intervention in the unionization process. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
1988
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Authors: | Horn, Henrik ; Wolinsky, Asher |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 98.1988, 391, p. 484-97
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
Saved in:
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