'Yes Men', Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Ewerhart, Christian ; Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 43, No. 1, September 2000 Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | D20 - Production and Organizations. General ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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