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~isPartOf:"Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE"
~person:"Nell, Martin"
~subject:"Adverse Selektion"
~subject:"Finanzausgleich"
~subject:"Game theory"
~subject:"Noncooperative game"
~subject:"Rechtsdurchsetzung"
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Independent safety controls with moral hazard
Feess, Eberhard
;
Nell, Martin
- In:
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE
158
(
2002
)
3
,
pp. 408-419
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001705546
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