Reputation concerns can discipline agents to take costly effort and generate good outcomes. But what if outcomes are … not always observed? We consider a model of reputation with shifting observability, and ask how this affects agents … reputation incentives and encourage effort. If an agent anticipates that outcomes may not be observed in the future, the benefits …

Classic models of reputation consider an agent taking costly actions to affect a single, homogeneous audience’s beliefs … reputation with multiple parties with diverse interests. In this paper we study reputation incentives for an agent who faces two … audiences with opposed preferences. We ask if the existence of multiple audiences per se changes reputation incentives. Further …

behavior is disciplined by reputational concerns, the value of reputation depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the … for analysts, and expectations about the future. We analyze a dynamic model of ratings where reputation is endogenous and …

reputation cannot credibly commit to exerting effort when working alone. However, by hiring and working with juniors of uncertain … reputation, seniors will have incentives to exert effort. Incentives for young agents arise from a concern for their own … reputation (and the opportunity to take over the firm) but older agents work for the reputation of their firms (and the …