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~person:"Bester, Helmut"
~person:"Hasija, Sameer"
~subject:"Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie"
~subject:"USA"
~type_genre:"Arbeitspapier"
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Search: subject:"Moral Hazard"
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Bester, Helmut
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1
Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability
Bester, Helmut
;
Yaofu, Ouyang
-
2017
This paper analyzes the optimal contract for a consumer to procure a credence good from an expert when (i) the expert might misrepresent his private information about the consumer’s need, (ii) the expert might not choose the requested service since his choice of treatment is non-observable,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781931
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2
Subjective evaluation versus public information
Bester, Helmut
;
Münster, Johannes
-
2013
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336
Saved in:
3
Subjective evaluation versus public information
Bester, Helmut
;
Münster, Johannes
-
2013
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781395
Saved in:
4
The role of Milestone-based contracts for coordination R&D partnership
Bhattacharya, Shantanu
;
Gaba, Vibha
;
Hasija, Sameer
-
2012
-
2 rev. vers. of 2011/95/TOM/OB
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009621617
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5
Joint product improvement by client and customer support center : the role of gain-share contracts in coordination
Bhattachary, Shantanu
;
Gupta, Alok
;
Hasija, Sameer
-
2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009356180
Saved in:
6
Optimal contracts for outsourcing of repair and restoration services
Jain, Nitish
;
Hasija, Sameer
;
Popescu, Dana
-
2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009356724
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7
Optimal contracts for coordinating the pharmaceutical R&D supply chain
Bhattacharya, Shantanu
;
Gaba, Vibha
;
Hasija, Sameer
-
2011
-
Rev. vers. of 2011/45/TOM/OB
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009356867
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8
Delegation and incentives
Bester, Helmut
;
Krähmer, Daniel
-
2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003413539
Saved in:
9
Delegation and incentives
Bester, Helmut
(
contributor
);
Krähmer, Daniel
(
contributor
)
-
2006
the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal. -- Authority ; delegation ; incentives ;
moral
…
hazard
; principal-agent problem ; limited liability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003422618
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