//--> //--> //-->
Toggle navigation
Logout
Change account settings
EN
DE
ES
FR
A-Z
Beta
About EconBiz
News
Thesaurus (STW)
Research Skills
Help
EN
DE
ES
FR
My account
Logout
Change account settings
Login
Publications
Events
Your search terms
Search
Retain my current filters
~person:"Englmaier, Florian"
~subject:"Arbeitsmobilität"
~subject:"Limited commitment"
Search options
All Fields
Title
Exact title
Subject
Author
Institution
ISBN/ISSN
Published in...
Publisher
Open Access only
Advanced
Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites
Loans
Reservations
Fines
You are here:
Home
Search: subject:"Moral hazard"
Narrow search
Delete all filters
| 3 applied filters
Year of publication
From:
To:
Subject
All
Arbeitsmobilität
Limited commitment
Moral Hazard
18
Moral hazard
18
Theorie
12
Theory
10
Contract theory
8
Leistungsanreiz
8
Performance incentive
8
Vertragstheorie
8
Beschränkte Haftung
7
ex-post outside option
7
limited commitment
7
limited liability
7
moral hazard
6
Gerechtigkeit
5
Justice
5
Labour mobility
5
Limited liability
5
Arbeitsbeziehungen
4
Bias
4
Employment relations
4
Systematischer Fehler
4
Bargaining theory
3
Verhandlungstheorie
3
Agency theory
2
Anreizvertrag
2
Arbeitsgruppe
2
Ex post outside option
2
Knowledge workers
2
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
2
Team
2
dynamic contracting
2
employment relations
2
present bias
2
reciprocity
2
Highly skilled workers
1
Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte
1
Social welfare function
1
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
1
more ...
less ...
Online availability
All
Free
6
Undetermined
2
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper
7
Article
2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper
5
Arbeitspapier
3
Graue Literatur
3
Non-commercial literature
3
Article in journal
1
Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
1
Language
All
English
8
Undetermined
1
Author
All
Englmaier, Florian
Roider, Andreas
9
Mühlheußer, Gerd
5
Gaur, Meghana
4
Hazell, Jonathon
4
Muehlheusser, Gerd
4
Ndiaye, Abdoulaye
3
Fahn, Matthias
2
Grigsby, John
2
Seibel, Regina
2
Stiglitz, Joseph E.
2
Abe, Yukiko
1
Andersberg, Dan
1
Andersson, Fredrik
1
Arnott, Richard
1
Arnott, Richard J.
1
Brunello, Giorgio
1
Choi, Kyoung Jin
1
Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia
1
Dumav, Martin
1
Fu, Kangkang
1
Fuchs, William
1
Gayle, George-Levi
1
Gersbach, Hans
1
Glazer, Amihai
1
Golan, Limor
1
Grigsby, John R.
1
Herbold, Daniel
1
Jeon, Junkee
1
Karajvanov, Alexander K.
1
Kwok, Wing Chun
1
Laat, Joost J. de
1
Lee, Ho-Seok
1
Lee, Jangwoo
1
Lin, Hsuan-Chih
1
Martin, Fernando M.
1
Miller, Robert Allen
1
Miniaci, Raffaele
1
Myerson, Roger B.
1
Parsons, Donald O.
1
more ...
less ...
Published in...
All
Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research
1
Discussion paper series / IZA
1
Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
1
European Economic Review
1
European economic review : EER
1
IZA Discussion Paper
1
IZA Discussion Papers
1
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper
1
more ...
less ...
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW)
6
EconStor
2
RePEc
1
Showing
1
-
9
of
9
Sort
relevance
articles prioritized
date (newest first)
date (oldest first)
1
Optimal incentive contracts under
moral
hazard
when the agent is free to leave
Englmaier, Florian
;
Mühlheußer, Gerd
;
Roider, Andreas
-
2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a
moral
hazard
framework extended in two directions. First, after effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822065
Saved in:
2
Optimal incentive contracts under
moral
hazard
when the agent is free to leave
Englmaier, Florian
;
Muehlheusser, Gerd
;
Roider, Andreas
-
2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a
moral
hazard
framework extended in two directions. First, after effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269938
Saved in:
3
Optimal Incentive Contracts under
Moral
Hazard
When the Agent is Free to Leave
Englmaier, Florian
;
Muehlheusser, Gerd
;
Roider, Andreas
-
2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a
moral
hazard
framework extended in two directions. First, after effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333930
Saved in:
4
Optimal incentive contracts under
moral
hazard
when the agent is free to leave
Englmaier, Florian
;
Mühlheußer, Gerd
;
Roider, Andreas
-
2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a
moral
hazard
framework extended in two directions. First, after effort … is exogenous instead, the standard results obtain. --
Moral
hazard
; limited commitment ; ex-post outside option …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003984691
Saved in:
5
Optimal incentive contracts under
moral
hazard
when the agent is free to leave
Englmaier, Florian
;
Mühlheußer, Gerd
;
Roider, Andreas
-
2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008934332
Saved in:
6
Optimal Incentive Contracts Under
Moral
Hazard
When the Agent is Free to Leave
Englmaier, Florian
-
2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a
moral
hazard
framework extended in two directions. First, after effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141421
Saved in:
7
Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers
Englmaier, Florian
;
Mühlheußer, Gerd
;
Roider, Andreas
- In:
European economic review : EER
67
(
2014
),
pp. 82-106
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423128
Saved in:
8
Optimal incentive contracts under
moral
hazard
when the agent is free to leave
Englmaier, Florian
;
Mühlheußer, Gerd
;
Roider, Andreas
-
2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994555
Saved in:
9
Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers
Englmaier, Florian
;
Muehlheusser, Gerd
;
Roider, Andreas
- In:
European Economic Review
67
(
2014
)
C
,
pp. 82-106
standard
moral-hazard
framework to reflect two key patterns: First, retention is a challenge because workers are free to leave …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048587
Saved in:
Results per page
10
25
50
100
250
A service of the
zbw
×
Loading...
//-->