levels if seller power is strong, while otherwise the joint profit maximizing quantities are contracted (which is also always … output levels when the buyer firm has sufficient (Nash) bargaining power (i.e., buyer power). Our result is driven by cost …

Research on bargaining power in vertical relationships is scarce. It remains particularly unclear which factors drive … bargaining power between the two negotiating parties in a vertical structure. We use a demand model where the consumer demand … split between retailers and manufacturers. Estimates show that bargaining power can be explained by several decision …

bargaining e¤ect. The former creates merger incentives while the later induces suppliers to bargain separately. When buyer power …

levels if seller power is strong, while otherwise the joint profit maximizing quantities are contracted (which is also always … output levels when the buyer firm has sufficient (Nash) bargaining power (i.e., buyer power). Our result is driven by cost …

buyer power. This argument crucially depends on an inverse relationship between downstream firms' profits and the uniform …

Research on bargaining power in vertical relationships is scarce. It remains particularly unclear which factors drive … bargaining power between negotiating parties in a vertical structure. We use a demand model where consumer demand determines the … between retailers and manufacturers. Estimates show that bargaining power can be explained by several decision variables for …

Research on bargaining power in vertical relationships is scarce. It remains particularly unclear which factors drive … bargaining power between negotiating parties in a vertical structure. We use a demand model where consumer demand determines the … retailers and manufacturers. Estimates show that bargaining power can be explained by several decision variables for retailers …